ABSTRACT Wireless sensor nodes have a wide span of applications ranging from industrial monitoring to military operations. These nodes are highly constrained in terms of battery life, processing capabilities, and in-built memory. Industrial wireless sensor networks (IWSNs) have to meet the constraints and peculiarities of industrial environments to ensure synchronization with parallel production processes. Applications of WSNs in industrial communication vary from condition monitoring and sensing to process automation. The 6LoWPAN standard enables efficient utilization of IPv6 protocol over low-power wireless personal area networks (LoWPANs). The use of 6LoWPANs for industrial communication necessitates the fulfillment of special QoS and security. We examine the aspect of secured information dissemination for industrial control and automation processes in this paper. Researchers have proposed several schemes to secure transfer of data over the Internet. Public key infrastructure (PKI) is one of the most popular security schemes being used in the present scenario. The hostile deployment scenarios of 6LoWPANs and resource constraints of the nodes necessitate the presence of a robust security mechanism to safeguard the communication. In this paper, we propose an integration scheme for PKI and 6LoWPAN to meet the enhanced security needs of industrial communication. The approach is to delegate a major portion of key management activity to the edge routers (gateway) of the LoWPAN and limit the involvement of the end nodes to minimal communication with the edge router. We do not propose a change in the current PKI, but we put forth a scheme to facilitate the integration of PKI to 6LoWPAN in an efficient manner. The effectiveness of the proposed algorithm was evaluated using a protocol analyzer for normal 6LoWPAN traffic as well as HUI HC-01 compressed traffic. A marginal increase of 2% in channel utilization was observed, which scaled down to 1% using HUI HC-01 compression. The results indicated that the proposed algorithm can be implemented for industrial control and automation networks without any speed, security, or performance tradeoffs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have been an area of research for the past decade. The use of sensor networks for industrial monitoring and control was appealing because the prevalent protocols; Highway Addressable Remote Transducer (HART), Common Industrial Protocol (CIP); used wired technology and hence were limited in scope. The goal being pursued by the researchers of the area was to integrate the low power sensor networks with the omnipresent Internet. This was achieved through the 6LoWPAN specification of 2007 [1] , [2] . 6LoWPAN allows the low power wireless personal area networks to communicate over IPv6 channels and gives birth to the concept of ''Internet of Things'' [3] . This enabling technology helps to integrate the physical world with the Internet and opens avenues for futuristic applications like smart cities [4] , self operating assembly lines, unsupervised factories etc. The ISA100 standard for wireless industrial automation was formulated by International Society of Automation (ISA) to cover the process and control needs of industrial networks [3] . Wireless HART and ZigBee, which were potential contenders of 6LoWPAN had limitations in terms of design and capabilities. Wireless HART does not support multiple protocols and was considered suitable only for control. Its role in industrial automation was therefore minimal. ZigBee failed to meet the stringent QoS requirements for industrial automation, specifically low latency requirements. The ISA 100.11a standard therefore proposed the use of 6LoWPAN network and transport layers. Physical and MAC layers were based on IEEE 802.15.4 standard. Being a network in its infancy, the 6LoWPAN suffers from some serious security concerns [5] which prove a hindrance in widespread adoption of the technology in industrial applications, that require high reliability and accuracy. Extension of IP protocols to low power networks was a topic of interest of many researchers [6] , [7] . With advancements in embedded systems technology, integration of IPv6 to low power wireless networks has now become possible [8] . Keying infrastructure has been one of the most researched upon security techniques for WSNs. Several keying schemes have been proposed by researchers [9] - [11] but our focus in this paper is on the public key infrastructure (PKI). We restrict ourselves to the PKI scenarios of countries like India and Europe [12] in which the digital signatures and private keys are allocated by a central authority and bind the user by law to his actions, making it equivalent to the real world signatures (Information Technology [IT] Act, 2000 of India) [13] . In such a scenario, the sensor nodes being deployed in a network would have their own public-private key pair pre-allocated by the root certifying authority (RCA) and would be used by nodes to digitally sign the communication with other nodes leading to non-repudiation and integrity of information.
A. MOTIVATION
Low power wireless personal area networks are characterized by low processing capability, less memory, low bit rate and limited radio range. Such networks are increasingly being used in industial applications ranging from passive monitoring to control and automation. 6LoWPAN standard focuses on the integration of low power sensor networks with the Internet, allowing them to use IPv6 to communicate with the rest of IPv6 enabled networks. 6LoWPAN is built over the MAC and physical layer specified in 802.15.4 standard and adds an adaptation layer and IPv6 supporting network layer [5] . The security concerns in LoWPAN are elevated on integration with IPv6 networks [11] . If the security framework is strengthened, 6LoWPAN has the potential of being used in industrial applications in addition to health care, home automation, war front monitoring, smart cities [4] etc. The 6LoWPAN specification does not cover security mechanism in great detail. It was assumed that the security features on the MAC layer as specified by the 802.15.4 [14] standard would secure communication on the lower layers. Security on the higher layers was left to be decided during LoWPAN implementation. We attempt to build a key management scheme to ensure authentication between the communicating nodes. The scheme will also safeguard against network layer attacks such as wormhole attacks, sinkhole attacks, black hole attacks etc. It will also enable secure bootstrapping of nodes. A robust key management scheme will facilitate the implementation of all these measures [5] , [15] . PKI is the most widely used keying infrastructure and in its traditional form, it is not considered a suitable candidate for 6LoWPAN security as the architecture has not been streamlined to suit the needs of 6LoWPAN networks. Its use is also discouraged as it creates a communication and processing overhead which rapidly depletes the resources of wireless sensor node [16] . Additionally, attacks on certification authorities have necessitated the need for efficient methods for certificate revocation and authorization, collectively referred to as certificate legislation [17] . Our aim in the paper is not to change the present PKI scheme but to provide a solution for its efficient use in industrial 6LoWPAN networks with our proposed key management scheme. In the proposed schema, we delegate the bulk of key management actions as well as the storage to the edge router. By bringing the PKI related information of the nodes closer to the LoWPAN, we relieve the resource constraint nodes of the task of processing key data.
B. BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES
The 6LoWPAN standard defined by Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) enabled integration of wireless embedded devices with IPv6. As most of these devices use 8/16 bit processors with limited memory and computational resources, traditional IP protocols were not suitable. The standard provided a suitable IP adaptation for such networks. Figure 1 shows the 6LoWPAN protocol stack [3] . Some characteristics of the 6LoWPAN networks are [3] Star: All nodes in this topology are connected to a single nodal node called border router (BR).
Mesh: Any node in this topology is interconnected to all other nodes. All nodes share the same prefix. Broadcast and hop-by-hop forwarding are supported in this topology.
Routed: Some nodes in this topology act as routers. Nodes, not connected directly, communicate by sending the packets to the router nodes; which in turn forward it to the destined node. A routing protocol runs on the nodes to populate the route information in the database.
2) ADDRESSING
6LoWPAN IP addressing is similar to regular addressing formats of IPv6 networks. The address contains a LoWPAN prefix and link layer address of the wireless adaptor. The addresses are 128 bit in length with a 64 bit prefix and 64 bit interface identifier (IID) [3] . IID is directly linked to link layer address of the network interface.
3) BOOTSTRAPPING 6LoWPAN nodes need to undergo an auto-configuration procedure on powering on before formal communication begins. This process, called bootstrapping, is performed by the link layer. The steps involved in this process include [3] :
• Addressing • Channel configuration • Default security key acquisition Neighbor discovery process is initiated after the initial link layer functionality formalizes. RFC 4861 [3] specified basic neighbor discovery but it could not meet the specific 6LoWPAN requirements. IETF specified the 6LoWPAN neighbor discovery (6LoWPAN-nd) which offers an optimized discovery service by maintaining an index of the nodes at the edge router.
4) RPL
Routing protocol for low-power and lossy network (RPL) [19] was developed by IETF in 2008 as a specific protocol to suit the IPv6 routing needs of resource constrained sensor networks [20] .
5) HEADER COMPRESSION
6LoWPAN technology provisions compression of IPv6 header to minimize the overhead and allow messages to be accommodated in a limited size frame. 6LoWPAN specifies a maximum data size of 127 bytes; however IPv6 requires minimum size of 1280 bytes. A fragmentation protocol bridges this gap in the MTU size [18] . The header compression scheme reduces the size of IPV6 header, eliminating the known fields and information not relevant to a layer.
6) PKI
PKI is a blanket term used to cover all techniques, methods and procedures used to provide a binding between an entity and its corresponding public key. This is accomplished by issuing a digital object called digital signature that contains information about the entity identity and its public key. A certification authority issues the digital certificate and signs it using its digital signature.
7) CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY
A certification authority (CA) is the trusted entity in PKI that certifies the binding of the public key and identity by issuing a public key certificate [21] . Though a CA is an essential component of most large scale PKIs, its presence is not mandatory in the PKI architecture. Small PKI implementations with limited nodes may function without a CA by acting as trusted centres themselves. A certificate repository is the central database of all public keys in the network.
8) CERTIFICATE FORMAT
Certificate formats are governed by certain standards [22] :
X.509 Standard: This is the most commonly used standard and was standardized by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Secure sockets layer (SSL) and transport layer security (TLS) protocols use this format for issuing signatures for communication over networks. MIME (multi-purpose internet mail extensions) and SMIME (secure/multipurpose internet mail extensions) also use the X.506 format for email security [22] . Figure 2 shows the X.509 certificate format [23] .
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP): PGP signatures have a very flexible format and support multiple entity names and signatures as opposed to X.509 certificates that support only single entity certification. The format is shown in Figure 3 . 
II. RELATED WORK
The 6LoWPAN working group works towards integration of the IP based infrastructure with WSNs. The problem with wireless sensor networks is that they are extremely limited in the case of battery power and bandwidth which makes it more complex to provide a specific type of cryptographic algorithm or to provide any kind of security schemes.
A. OPTIMIZATION OF PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY
Ayuso et al. [24] analyzed the security requirements for IoT (Internet of Things) applications and evaluated the working and the optimization of the RSA and ECC algorithms. Their implementation was based on bit shifting rather than using the expensive and time consuming multiplication operation of the microprocessor. The need was felt for the support of public key cryptography (PKC) over 6LoWPANs to support the scalability issues of expanding networks. He et al. [25] explored the possibility of using an enhanced version of PKI to secure smart grid wireless networks. They introduced mechanisms to complement the existing PKI techniques. A technique to thwart the denial of service attacks was proposed. Suggestions were also made for improving design of security protocol. Li et al. [26] proposed a scheme to allow PKI elements to communicate securely with Identity based cryptosystems (IBC). They proposed two schemes, one to send message from a PKI sender to IBC receiver and other from IBC sender to PKI receiver. The schemes were proved to be resistant against adaptive chosen cipher text and chosen message attacks.
B. SECURITY SCHEMES WITH KEY MANAGEMENT FEATURES
Riaz et al. [27] proposed a framework with three key management schemes using symmetric, asymmetric and hybrid key cryptography. The respective schemes were named SACK, SACK-P, SACK-H. Their network model of WSN consisted of a BS (Base Station) and a number of nodes grouped in clusters. The nodes were classified as CL (Cluster Leader) and CN (Cluster Node). Two approaches followed were:
• Key distribution to be started after the BS initialization.
• Sending a signal to the BS whenever a new node joined the network (BS kept a count of all the nodes and the signal and started the key management process after both equalized). Yao and Zhao [28] proposed a change in the underlying protocol for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). Their approach used a modified privacy preserving version of the DiffeHellman key exchange. The new protocol, named deniable internet key exchange (DIKE) was tested in the traditional PKI scenario as well as in identity based scenario.
C. KEY REVOCATION
Gianluca and Savino [29] provided a key revocation protocol which governed the efficient storage, distribution and communication of new keys. The proposed method reduced the number and size of re-keying messages. Wasef and Shen [30] proposed a new protocol to replace the certificate revocation lists in vehicular ad-hoc networks. Their method used an authentication code based on hash values. A probabilistic key distribution scheme was used to share the key only with non-revoked units. The method contributed in significantly reducing the message loss ratio, which was proved using analysis and performance evaluation.
D. 6LoWPAN WITH IPSec
The integration of IPv6 with 6LoWPAN [31] portrays the necessity of replacing the inherent security methods defined by IEEE 802.15.4. Raza et al. [31] provided a mechanism to extend the use of IPSec with 6LoWPAN and to present the implementation and analysis of integration of IPv6 and 6LoWPAN. As the inbuilt security mechanisms of IEEE 802.15.4 were not used, significant header space was saved. The IPSec standard defines an AH (Authentication Header) and ESP (Encapsulation Security Payload). So if the IPv6 hosts support IPSec mechanism, the flow of data between the 6LoWPAN nodes and IPv6 hosts will eventually take advantage of the existing capabilities of the present secured network.
E. KEY DISTRIBUTION
Bechkit et al. [32] proposed a scalable key management scheme for WSNs. They proposed a unital design based mapping to provide a secure key sharing framework. An enhanced version of unital mapping was proposed to increase the key sharing probability. Simulation and analysis were used to prove the effectiveness of the proposed solution in reducing the storage overhead and increasing scalability. Hangyang and Hongbing [33] proposed key predistribution using a technique called LU matrix. LU matrix based algorithms were used to decompose the polynomial and calculate the shared keys. The method also protected the system against node capture attacks. The earlier key distribution schemes provided a number of viable solutions but they never took an approach for a prior node deployment scheme. Eschenauer and Gligor [34] proposed a node deployment technique to be implemented as a part of a pre-key distribution scheme for the sensor networks. In the proposed scheme, a set of nodes received a subset of keys and two nodes found a common key within their mentioned subset and used it as their shared secret key. Node deployment substantially improved the network's performance by maintaining the spatial relations between the sensor nodes and the knowledge of the neighbors of each sensor node. Probability density function (PDF) was used to predict the deployment strategy.
F. TRUST MANAGEMENT
Ren et al. [35] proposed a trust management scheme for wireless sensor networks in unreliable and noisy environments. Geographic hash tables were used to enable sensor nodes to retrieve and submit data to designated storage nodes. Wang and Wu [36] suggested a cooperation based trust model for mobile ad hoc networks. They argued that recommendation based trust degrades the network performance due to fake recommends. Hence a topology transform based recommendation was proposed.
III. ASSUMPTIONS
In the proposed scheme, we concentrate on the integration and implementation of 6LoWPAN networks with the existing PKI infrastructure of countries like India [37] . The proposed algorithms are solely for the secure exchange of packets in the LoWPAN using PKI and not for packets going out of the LoWPAN. For all the packets going out of the LoWPAN, the existing PKI infrastructure is used as it is for other Internet implementations. We take the following assumptions into consideration for the rest of the discussions in the paper:
The nodes comprising the LoWPAN have two keys stored in their memory for the lifetime
• Private key of the node • Public key of the edge router The central repository of all the keys is the edge router. It holds all the public-private key pairs for the nodes registered in the LoWPAN. The edge router also contains the revocation list of the revoked keys. In addition, it also holds the public key of the CA server. The connectivity of the edge router to the CA server through the wired network is assumed to be uninterrupted through built-in network redundancy. It is theoretically assumed that the edge router is static, i.e. it has unlimited available resources. The edge router is assumed to be the only gateway to the Internet and all the data required to be sent outside the LoWPAN are sent through it. Figure 4 discusses the deployment scenarios with the different network layouts and devices in our proposed scheme.
IV. DEPLOYMENT SCENARIO

A. DEVICES
The types of devices in the network and their assigned functions are [37] :
Host Node and Destination Node (End Devices): End devices are the LoWPAN entities that act as the terminal nodes for any requests. Host node is the originator of the packet. Every host in the LoWPAN contains its private key which is issued by the CA. The public key required by the nodes to communicate with the edge router is acquired during initial bootstrapping procedure. Thus, every host contains two keys:
• Its own private key • The public key of the edge router The destination node decrypts the encrypted message using its private key. It is mandatory for all the devices to have the same first 64 bits of the IPv6 address, called the prefix. Routers: These devices act as path finders between the host nodes and carry out the routing functions in the LoWPAN. They contain the routing table which is created by using any shortest path first algorithm. Edge Router: The edge router acts as the gateway of the LoWPAN to the Internet or other IPv6 enabled networks. The edge router also performs the remodeling and adaptation functions including header compression for incoming packets and expansion for outgoing packets. It is the central storehouse of all the PKI information of the LoWPAN. It contains the public keys of the CA server and all the nodes in the LoWPAN. It is the responsibility of the edge router to provide the public keys of any destination node, if requested by another host node in the LoWPAN. In the scenario of an extended LoWPAN which contains more than one edge router, the edge routers are connected through a common backbone link. CA Server: This is the server of the certification authority containing the public keys of all the devices. The server is remotely located and is connected to the IPv6 network. It vouches for the authenticity of all the certified nodes for which keys have been issued. It also manages the revocation lists of the compromised or expired keys. The edge router connects to the CA server to update the key details for the associated LoWPAN.
B. NETWORK LAYOUT
Two types of network layouts are considered in our paper. The classification is on the basis of the number of edge routers.
1) Simple LoWPAN:
A simple LoWPAN layout is characterized by a single edge router, which works as the LoWPAN coordinator. All nodes joining the LoWPAN have to get registered with the edge router during bootstrapping. The public keys of all the devices in the LoWPAN are present only at one location.
2) Extended LoWPAN:
The extended LoWPAN is characterized by the presence of more than one edge routers. The routers are connected to each other through a backbone link. All the edge routers stay synchronized by sharing any received LoWPAN related data with each other through the backbone. It is therefore a pre-requisite for the edge routers to have the same IPv6 address prefix. A host device chooses any one of the edge routers as its gateway depending on the proximity. A node can register with any one of the edge routers when it has to connect to the LoWPAN. The basic configuration and the related information about the new node are communicated to the other edge routers through the backbone. The network deployment scenario can be represented as the following set space:
S represents the super space of all the sensor nodes
where n is the number of nodes in the network. The signal observations by each sensor node are represented as
Noise is assumed to be spatially uncorrelated and has zero mean and variance σ 2 n Routers in the LoWPAN are represented by subspace R S
m n Edge Routers set is given by
where p is a number > 1 For a simple LoWPAN, p = 1
C. POSSIBILITIES BASED ON DEVICE FAILURES AND ADDITIONS
Mechanism adopted by the network to counter with the failure possibilities are discussed in this section. Extended Layout: In this layout, the failure of an edge router has considerably lesser impact as the other edge routers are still available in the network and act as potential gateways to the IPv6 networks. Failure of an edge router triggers a simple recompilation of shortest paths and update of routing tables of all the routers which are affected by the failure. The end devices are re-routed to the other remaining edge routers through the new learned routes.
2) Lost Connection Between Edge Router and IPv6 Network
In such a scenario, the affected edge router continues to act as the LoWPAN coordinator but is unable to route packets out of the network. The end devices may be directed to hold to the packets in their local memory till the connection with IPv6 network is re-established by the edge router or a buffer can be used to store the outgoing packets in the edge router.
3) Addition of New Nodes to the LoWPAN After Initial Deployment
When a new node initiates a connection with a LoWPAN, the nearest edge router initiates the bootstrapping process for the remodeling the new node and assigns it an IPv6 address matching the addressing schema of the network. Also during bootstrapping, the public key of the edge router is transferred to the new node. To facilitate secure communication to the new node by the existing devices, the public key of the device is acquired by the edge router through the CA server. Information about the new node is disseminated to other routers in the LoWPAN through neighbor discovery mechanism. In an extended LoWPAN layout, the related information along with the newly acquired public key is disseminated to all the other edge routers.
V. REQUEST PACKET FORMAT
In a 6LoWPAN packet header, the first byte is the dispatch byte. It signifies the type of header following the first byte. A pattern of 01000001 signifies a normal IPv6 header while a pattern of 01000010 signifies a compressed IPv6 header [1] . Figure 5 shows the 6LoWPAN header format. Header compression schemes are generally used to reduce the redundant data in the packet header such as the common IPv6 prefix in the addresses. Removing redundancies increases the available space for payload in a packet. Fig. 6 illustrates the format of the proposed request packet. The two most significant bits (MSB) in a dispatch byte specify the type of packet. The values of the remaining six bits are used to specify other configuration parameters like the compression scheme, broadcast, multicast etc. Table 1 lists the values of the MSBs corresponding to the header packet type. Most of these bits are reserved for future use and only few have fixed defined domains.
VI. ALGORITHM
The core of the proposed scheme is the activity of acquiring the public key of the destination by the source from the edge router. The effectiveness of the communication between the nodes would be correlative to the key acquisition procedure. This slight handshaking mechanism between the node and the edge router would translate into an introduction of a small time delay in initiation of the actual data transfer. However this trade-off of time delay pays off in terms of an escalated security. The delay can be quantified in the form of a parameter 'delay diameter' [38] . The diameter is approximated as
where x is the average distance between the nodes c is the duty cycle parameter. It implies a node is assigned one time slot out of c available slots [38] n is the number of nodes in the sensor network Calculation of x for a Particular Node: Let L : l 1 , l 2 , · · · , l a represent the available paths/links and the corresponding path probabilities be represented by vector P l = {pl 1 , pl 2 , · · · , pl a } For a node i, average path length (x i ) is the expectation of all the path lengths.
Overall x for the sub-network under consideration can be evaluated by taking simple mean of the individual average path lengths
The proposed algorithm has three steps as outlined:
Step 1: The source node formulates a request packet, and sends it to the edge router requesting for the public key of the destination node.
Step 2: A querying process is triggered at the edge router to retrieve the public key of the destination from the LKDB. A data packet with the requested public key is formulated by the edge router and sent to the source.
Step 3: The source nodes receives the data packet, de-strips it and acquires the public key of destination. The public key is used to initiate a secure communication session with the destination node. 
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION A. SELECTING THE TEST BED
The choice of test bed, on which the algorithm can be tested, is crucial in terms of accuracy and time to deploy. The following were the options for selection of the test bed on which we could test our algorithm:
• Hardware Implementation (Texas Instruments-Node View)
• Simulation (MATLAB)
• Protocol analyzer (Perytons Protocol analyzer [39] ) Table 2 gives a comparison of the three methods in terms of practical implications faced in implementing the algorithm and the reason for the selection of protocol analyzer as the preferred test bed. The test bed was selected based on the following criteria: Cost: implies the cost of the total setup required to implement and test the algorithm.
Hardware: implies the need for actual hardware to accurately test the algorithm.
Accuracy: implies the precision of capturing data or packets.
Reliability: implies the accuracy in repeating data capture under different conditions.
Real time: implies the mode of data capture (whether simulated or real time)
Time to code: signifies the amount of time required to code the system and prepare it for data capture.
Flexibility: signifies the ease in rearranging the sensor nodes and get the data capture started.
Access to protocol stacks: signifies the ability to access protocol stacks and modify them.
Viewing message traffic: signifies the ability of the test bed to view incoming and outgoing messages.
Viewing network topology: signifies the ability of the test bed to view the positions of various devices and sensors and the flow of traffic between them. It is clearly visible in Table 2 that the protocol analyzer provides the best option for implementing our algorithm efficiently in terms of time to implement, flexibility and the cost associated with implementing the algorithm on various 6LoWPAN devices. The data captured is also real time as the traffic generated from the scripts is captured from real time devices. The protocol stacks are easily accessible. The message traffic can be viewed in the order of their arrival along with the time of their arrival.
The analyzer test bed supports IEEE 802.15.4 in 868 MHz, 915 MHz and 2.4 GHz bands through discrete channels. Support for 868 MHz is on Channel 0 and 915 on Channel 1-10. For 2.4 GHz, channel numbers are specified by the following formula:
{n=11-26} where n gives the channel number B. A SAMPLE NETWORK TOPOLOGY Figure 8 denotes a random network topology implemented using 6LoWPAN devices. The devices (DEV) are numbered from 1 to 11. Devices 1, 2 and 3 are used for testing the proposed algorithm. If the algorithm works for communication between devices 1 and 3, it will work for any of the paths possible in the represented topology. We have used two separate methods on the same network topology to analyze the performance of our algorithm. The first method incorporates packet capture and analysis of normal 6LoWPAN traffic, whereas, in the second method, packet capture and traffic analysis of 6LoWPAN traffic with HUI HC-01 [40] header compression is performed.
C. DECODING THE CAPTURED PACKETS Figure 9 shows a screenshot of the transmitted messages during packet capture of the transmission between Dev-1 to Dev-3. As the 6LoWPAN technology incorporates IPv6, captured packets. Figures 10, 11 and 12 give an expanded view of the various fields in captured 6LoWPAN traffic. Figure 13 shows the IP field of captured 6LoWPAN traffic with HC 01 header compression. The difference between the IP fields of normal 6LoWPAN traffic and with HC 01 header compression is clearly visible from Figure 12 and 13 respectively. Figure 14 gives a comparative analysis of the traffic passing through the three layers (Physical, Mac and LoWPAN) of each device incorporating the algorithm on normal 6LoWPAN traffic. The majority of the traffic share is occupied by the MAC layer, with an approximate range of 93.9%. The physical layer processes traffic of about 6% of the whole load. The LoWPAN layer processes the lowest traffic with a share of about 0.1% of the whole traffic. Figure 15 gives the comparison between the traffic passing through different layers in devices incorporating 6LoWPAN traffic with HUI HC 01 header compression. The majority of the traffic passes through the MAC layer (93.2%) and the remaining through the PHY layer (6.8%) for a sample simulation of transmitting 811 messages. Figure 16 shows the histogram plot of the message length versus the number of messages in case of transmission of normal 6LoWPAN traffic. This plot gives a clear idea about the distribution of the average message size that is being transmitted. It can be easily seen that the maximum distribution of messages is in the post 90 byte range. This signifies that as the average message size is quite big it takes more time to transmit a single message packet resulting in more power consumption than if the message size were smaller. Figure 17 shows the message length histogram for HUI HC 01 compressed 6LoWPAN traffic.
D. PERFORMANCE OF THE ALGORITHM
The maximum density of message distribution is the sub 90 byte range as the packets have been fragmented due to the compression algorithm. As the messages in the HUI HC 01 compressed traffic are smaller than the messages in the first case (uncompressed 6LoWPAN traffic), the messages are transmitted faster, resulting in low power consumption than the first case. Figure 18 shows the channel utilization statistics for transmission between two 6LoWPAN devices running uncompressed 6LoWPAN traffic. The dark line gives the real time utilization percentage with respect to time. The lighter curve gives the average value of the channel utilization percentage. Figure 19 shows the channel utilization for HUI HC 01 compressed 6LoWPAN traffic. It is evident from Figure 18 and 19 that the compressed 6LoWPAN traffic gives better channel utilization statistics as most of the messages are fragmented and they do not hog the channel, as compared to uncompressed 6LoWPAN traffic. The channel utilization is below 1% for the compressed traffic as compared to approximately 2% for the uncompressed traffic. This signifies that the compression of the header data significantly improves channel utilization. The benefit attributed to compression is quantized by parameter utilization efficiency (µ c hannel) given by: where µ channel Utilization efficiency δ uncompressed Channel Utilization with normal traffic δ compressed Channel Utilization with compressed traffic Thus a utilization efficiency of 50% is achieved by using HUI HC 01 compression. Figures 20 and 21 show the comparative histograms of the message types being processed by devices during transmission of uncompressed 6LoWPAN and HUI compressed 6LoWPAN traffic respectively. It is quite evident from the protocol analysis that the number of LoWPAN packets has reduced drastically in the compressed 6LoWPAN scheme than was present during the uncompressed 6LoWPAN traffic.
E. SIMPLIFIED PROTOCOL MODEL
The proposed schema can be modeled by a cooperative protocol model which is adaptive. We based our model on the cooperative communication framework for fixed and adaptive relaying schemes [41] . The disconnection probability (Pr dis ) of the network is a suitable measure of the performance of the protocol. For a network with maximum transmission rate of µ, this probability is defined as:
I (x, y) is the mutual information of the channel and is often characterized as a random variable due to the uncertain nature of the wireless channels. For simplicity we assume the channel to be half duplex. An additive white Gaussian noise model, with zero mean and variance noise, is assumed for the channel. The simplified cooperation model is illustrated in Figure 22 . If both the end device and edge router transmit at equal power levels given by P TX , and the signal transmitted by sending device is x transmit , the signal retransmitted by the edge router is given by [β * √ P TX * x transmit ]. This is based on the simplifying assumption that the transmitted signal has unit variance. β is a scaling factor that takes into account the effect of fading.
h ser : Channel coefficients from sender to edge router h erd : Channel coefficients from edge router to destination Mutual Information I (x, y) is given by [41] :
Functions f (x) and g(x) are complex non linear functions of the channel coefficients hser and herd respectively. h ser and h erd are obtained empirically through channel sounding techniques. Once I (x, y) is known, probability of disconnection can be obtained.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The stringent security requirements for industrial control and automation, 6LoWPANs entailing the requirement of a robust security framework for inter node communication. PKI is not considered a viable alternative as it creates a communication and processing overhead which goes against the basic constraints on a wireless sensor node. We propose an efficient integration scheme for PKI and 6LoWPANs to strengthen the application base for industrial communication. We put forth a key management scheme which delegates majority of processing overhead to the edge router which is the gateway of the LoWPAN and does not have any of the constraints of a simple wireless node. The edge router maintains a local key database which is the master repository of all the keying information of the 6LoWPAN nodes. The edge router performs regular synchronization with the CA server in an encrypted mode over a wired IPv6 network, to keep itself updated of the latest key database. Every end node has only two keys permanently during its lifetime: public key of the edge router with which it registered for the LoWPAN and its own private key. In this scheme, the resource constrained end nodes are freed from any processing related to keying. The end node has to acquire only the required public key from the edge router and encrypt the messages to be transmitted. We agree to a time trade-off in order to achieve a higher sense of security in the LoWPAN. The implementation of the proposed PKI schema on 6LoWPAN nodes has very minor implications on traffic speed and channel utilization. The somewhat increased channel utilization (2%) due to encryption of data can be reduced to 1% by means of various header compression techniques such as HUI HC 01, which improves the performance of the devices in terms of channel utilization, power consumption and time. The headers in normal 6Lowpan traffic, which are quite long, resulting in increased transmission time and channel hogging, are fragmented by means of the aforementioned compression algorithm, which increases the performance of the same devices. Thus, our algorithm can be safely implemented on industrial 6LoWPAN devices without the need to tradeoff speed, security or performance.
SUDIP MISRA (SM'11) received the bachelor's degree from IIT Kharagpur, India, the master's degree from the University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, Canada, and the Ph.D. degree in computer science from Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. He was associated with Cornell University, USA, Yale University, USA, Nortel Networks, Canada, and the Government of Ontario, Canada. He has several years of experience in the academia, the government, and the private sectors in research, teaching, consulting, project management, architecture, software design, and product engineering roles. He is currently an Associate Professor with the School of Information Technology, IIT Kharagpur. He has authored over 170 scholarly research papers. He has edited six books in the areas of wireless ad hoc networks, wireless sensor networks, wireless mesh networks, communication networks and distributed systems, network reliability and fault tolerance, and information and coding theory, published by reputed publishers, such as Springer, Wiley, and World Scientific. His current research interests include algorithm design for emerging communication networks. He has received seven research paper awards in different conferences. Recently, he was a recipient of the IEEE ComSoc Asia Pacific Outstanding Young Researcher Award at the IEEE GLOBECOM in Anaheim, CA, USA, in 2012. He is also a recipient of several academic awards and fellowships, such as the Young Scientist Award (the National Academy of Sciences, India), the Young Systems Scientist Award (the Systems Society of India), the Young Engineers Award (the Institution of Engineers, India), the Governor Generals Academic Gold Medal (Canadian) at Carleton University, the University Outstanding Graduate Student Award in the Doctoral level at Carleton University and the National Academy of Sciences, and the India-Swarna Jayanti Puraskar (Golden Jubilee Award). He received the Canadian Government's Prestigious NSERC Post-Doctoral Fellowship and the Humboldt Research Fellowship in Germany. He was also invited to deliver keynote/invited lectures in over 20 international conferences in USA, Canada, Europe, Asia, and Africa.
SUMIT GOSWAMI is currently an Additional Director/Scientist in Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), Ministry of Defence, Government of India. He did his M.Tech. degree in computer science and engineering from IIT Kharagpur. He also holds a Post-Graduate Diploma in journalism and mass communication, a bachelor's degree in library and information science, and a B.Tech. degree in computer science and engineering. Presently, he is also a Research Scholar at IIT Kharagpur doing his Ph.D. His areas of interest include network centric operations, mobile ad hoc and sensor networks, Webhosting security, text mining, and machine learning. He has worked in the field of information security, information dissemination systems, and secure networks. He has published more than 50 papers/chapters in various journals, books, data competitions, and conferences. He is a Reviewer for over a dozen international journals, and has been serving in the program committees of some national and international conferences. 
